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INTRODUCTION
Traditional political morality . . . has adopted a discourse in
which disability, in virtue of the functional limitations it
represents, is easily supposed to alter people so profoundly as to
render them “naturally” and irredeemably unequal. As a
result, many traditional democratic accounts of justice have
failed to embrace people with disabilities and so have not
advanced them, while many others have immobilized the
disabled in a suffocating embrace. 1

John Rawls has been called the most significant and
influential moral philosopher of the twentieth century, and his
ideas have deeply influenced discussions of social, political, and
economic justice across disciplines including law, philosophy,
and political science. Given his preeminence, does Rawls’s
theory of justice as fairness fail in either of the two ways
described above or is it a promising analysis for achieving justice
for people with disabilities?
In its most recent terms, the Supreme Court has
increasingly turned its attention toward the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (the ADA).2 In several significant
decisions, it has grappled with the questions of who should be
protected under the ADA and what such protection requires.3 In
1 ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (James
P. Sterba & Rosemarie Tong eds., 1998).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
3 In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471 (1999), Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) and Murphy v. UPS,
527 U.S. 516 (1999) on the issue of standing. In 2001, the Court decided Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), which
exempted states from suits for damages under the ADA. In 2002, it issued four more
ADA decisions. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002) (concluding
punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under section 202 of
the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 83 (2002) (finding EEOC regulation authorizing refusal to
hire an individual because of his performance on the job would endanger his own
health, owing to a disability, does not exceed the scope of permissible rulemaking
under ADA); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (determining
that a requested accommodation conflicts with the rules of a seniority system when
it is shown that the accommodation is not “reasonable,” and such a showing entitles
an employer/defendant to summary judgment unless the plaintiff/employee presents
evidence of special circumstances that make reasonable a seniority rule exception in
a particular case); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195–96 (2002)
(construing “substantially limited” in performing manual tasks to mean that an
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
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the wake of these decisions, workers with disabilities4 have
found it increasingly difficult to assert and protect their right to
be free of discrimination in the workplace, and debate regarding
who should be protected under the ADA and what such
protection requires has intensified. Attempts to reconcile the
decisions to the language and purposes of the ADA, however
defined, lead back to more fundamental questions about
disability: what does it mean to have a disability, and what, if
anything, is society obligated to do for people with disabilities?5
In light of this continued uncertainty and Rawls’s recent and
final reformulation of his theory of justice as fairness in Justice
as Fairness: A Restatement, it is an especially appropriate time
to take a fresh look at Rawls’s work in the context of disability,
specifically Title I of the ADA.
This Article seeks to use Rawls’s recently restated
methodology as a philosophical foundation from which to
evaluate the structure and content of the ADA, as well as recent
ADA jurisprudence. Part I provides an overview of Title I of the
ADA and of Rawls’s recent reformulation of his theory of justice
as fairness. Part II articulates a Rawlsian approach to the
problem of disability-based discrimination in employment,
focusing primarily on the two parts of Rawls’s second principle of
justice: the Principle of Fair Opportunity and the Difference
Principle. Part III uses Rawls’s methodology to critique recent
ADA jurisprudence and argues that these cases were not decided
based on the values of distributive justice or the language and
lives).

4 The term “worker” as used in this Article refers to both current employees
and applicants. Evidence suggests that the vast majority of ADA disputes arise in
cases in which the employee is already working for the employer. Cf. John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991) (discussing employment
discrimination after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and noting “antidiscrimination
laws are predominantly used to protect the existing positions of incumbent
workers”). In addition, this Article uses the term “worker with a disability,” rather
than terms such as “disabled worker” or “handicapped worker,” which tend to define
the individual only in terms of the disability. For a discussion of the social meaning
of common terminology used to identify or describe people with disabilities, see
generally Paul K. Longmore, A Note on Language and the Social Identity of
Disabled People, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 419 (1985) and Tanya Titchkosky,
Disability: A Rose by Any Other Name? “People- First” Language in Canadian
Society, 38 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 125 (2001).
5 These two questions were posed by Richard K. Scotch in Models of Disability
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000).
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stated purposes of the ADA. Finally, Part IV identifies several of
the limitations of a Rawlsian interpretation of the ADA and the
consequences of those limitations for workers with disabilities.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

An Overview of the ADA’s Employment Title

The ADA was enacted to “provide clear, strong, consistent,
[and] enforceable standards [for] addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities” and to bring such
individuals into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.6 It prohibits discrimination in employment,
public services, public transportation, public accommodations,
and public services operated by private entities and
telecommunications.7 Although it is based on Title VII of the
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
Other federal statutes which protect people with disabilities include the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1487 (2000)
(guaranteeing that each child with disabilities will have an “individualized plan” so
that he or she can receive a “free appropriate education”); the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001–15115
(2000) (guaranteeing that individuals with developmental disabilities and their
families “participate in the design of and have access to needed community services,
individualized supports and other forms of assistance”); the Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2000) (prohibiting any carrier, including a foreign
carrier, from discriminating against an otherwise qualified individual with a mental
or physical handicap); the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act
of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee-1–1973ee-6 (2000) (improving access for handicapped
and elderly individuals to registration facilities and polling places for federal
elections); sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–
796 (2000) (creating regulations for employment of disabled individuals under
federal government contracts; prohibiting exclusion of otherwise qualified
individuals with disability from the participation in, denial of benefits of, or being
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance; ordering the removal of architectural, transportation, or communication
barriers; guaranteeing that federal employees and members of the public who are
disabled have the same access to, and use of, information and data that is
comparable to the access to and use of the information and data by federal
employees and members of the public who are not disabled; providing a support
system in each state to protect the legal and human rights of individuals who are
otherwise ineligible under 29 U.S.C. § 732, 42 U.S.C. § 15041, 42 U.S.C. § 10801);
the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2000)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap in the sale or rental of housing,
in residential real estate related transactions and in the provision of brokerage
services). See generally RUTH COLKER ET AL., THE LAW OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the history and effectiveness of these
statutes).
6
7
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),8 which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and
religion, Title I of the ADA contains several distinctive and
significant features.
1.

The Definition of “Disabled”

Unlike Title VII, which allows anyone to raise a claim for
discrimination based on the protected categories of race, national
origin, sex, or religion, the ADA grants standing only to
“qualified individuals with a disability.”9 The ADA defines
“disability” to mean, with respect to any individual: (1) “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more . . . major life activities”; or (2) “a record of such an
impairment”; or (3) “being regarded as having such an
impairment” regardless of whether the individual actually has
the impairment.10
The first prong of the definition of disability corresponds to
a medical-functional approach to disability that focuses on the
physical or biological impairment of the individual.11 The focus
on biology is evident in the definition of “impairment” as “[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the . . . body systems” or
“[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities,” and excluding
environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages.12 The
functional approach is reflected in the definition of “major life
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). For the suggestion that the ADA should be
amended to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of a disability” generally, rather
than prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability, see
Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1999).
10 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
11 For a complete description and discussion of the functional–medical model
and the experiential–social models of disability, see Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability,
Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1191–1203 (2002).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998). According to the “Interpretative Guidance”
provided by the EEOC, other specific exclusions from the definition of impairment
include: predisposition to illness or disease, pregnancy, common personality traits,
and “normal” deviations in physical traits and characteristics. See 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, App. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
8
9
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activities” that include, but are not limited to, “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.”13 Moreover, a major life
activity is substantially limited within the meaning of the
statute if the individual is “[u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can
perform” or is “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which [he or she] can perform a
particular major life activity” as compared to the general
population.14
The second and third prongs of the definition of disability
represent an experiential-social approach to disability because
they focus on the social context that creates discrimination or
disadvantage, rather than on the real or perceived impairment.
For example, the EEOC has defined the “regarded as” prong to
mean:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairment defined in paragraphs (h) (1) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a
substantially limiting impairment.15

Meeting the definition of “disability” is a necessary but not
sufficient step in establishing standing, which is limited to
otherwise qualified individuals with a disability.16 A worker
with a disability as defined by the ADA still can be barred from
the workplace if not “otherwise qualified,” which includes
meeting legitimate qualifications that are job related and
consistent with business necessity. An example of a business
necessity is that the worker not constitute a “direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”17

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
Id. § 1630.2(j).
15 Id. § 1630.2(l); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489–90
(1999) (discussing the “regarded as” prong).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
17 Id. § 12113(a)–(b).
13
14
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The Scope of Reasonable Accommodation

In addition to the traditional forms of discrimination such as
those prohibited by Title VII,18 the ADA also prohibits “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer]
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business.”19
As defined by the ADA, reasonable accommodation is a
flexible, interactive, and personalized process. It may include:
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities”; restructuring
work schedules, reassigning individuals to other positions;

18 Compare id. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.”), with id. § 2000e-2. The latter provides that under Title
VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2.
19 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Prior to the ADA, “reasonable accommodation” had been
used in two very dissimilar capacities. “Reasonable accommodation” was used in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which applies to schools and housing
providers receiving federal assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). “Reasonable
accommodation” was also used in the context of Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of religion, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), which was
interpreted as no more than a de minimus cost to an employer, and severely
restricted by the courts to avoid conflict with the First Amendment prohibition
against establishing religion. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 84–85 (1977); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 511–13 (1991) (discussing “reasonable accommodation”
under Title VII and the ADA). The religious discrimination interpretation was
specifically rejected by the legislature in the context of the ADA. Id. at 513 (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 68 (1990)). Thus, “[a]lthough the ADA is not the first civil
rights legislation to use the concept of reasonable accommodation,” it is the first to
“invest[] reasonable accommodation with significant and far-reaching meaning.”
Pendo, supra note 11, at 1180.
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acquiring or modifying equipment, examinations, or training
procedures; and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.”20
Courts have held that reasonable
accommodation includes such changes as specialized testing,
training, or other work procedures;21 provision of specialized
equipment or other physical modifications of the workplace;22
and job restructuring.23
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
See, e.g., Mulholland v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc., 52 Fed. Appx. 641, 648
(6th Cir. 2002) (concluding employer adequately accommodated employee’s shortterm memory problems caused by traumatic brain injury by providing written
instructions regarding how to prepare timecards); Williams v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 253 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 2001) (determining that under ADA, “[a] blind
person cannot insist that her employer teach her Braille, though she may be able to
insist that her employer provide certain signage in Braille to enable her to navigate
the workplace”); Vollmert v. Wisconsin DOT, 197 F.3d 293, 302 (7th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing under the ADA, employer did not reasonably accommodate learning
disabilities that interfered with employee’s ability to master new computer system
when it refused to provide training sufficiently designed to address her disability,
and refused her request for a tutor trained in learning disabilities after she
indicated that a tutor was likely available free of charge through government
agency); Fink v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Personnel, 53 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding employer sufficiently accommodated visually-impaired candidates for
promotion by providing them with tape recording of examination, tape recorder,
reader-assistant to help with operation of recorder and to read questions and
answers, a private room, and double time afforded to other candidates). But see
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. School Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999)
(agreeing with school district that it was not required to retrain and assign disabled
head custodian to entirely different position, such as courier or bus dispatcher,
which positions were not available at relevant time); Needle v. Alling & Cory, Inc.,
88 F. Supp. 2d 100, 108 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing employee’s disability claim
because employer has no obligation to retrain disabled employee for position for
which he is not qualified).
22 See, e.g., Trepka v. Bd. of Educ., 28 Fed. Appx. 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that employer reasonably accommodated teacher with disability by offering
teacher a cart to carry her teaching materials and/or assistance of custodian to carry
materials); Jensen v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 7 Fed. Appx. 778, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding employer’s failure to provide orthopedic chair during one-week training
session, in light of other accommodations it had provided in the past, including:
modified workstation, high orthopedic chair, additional time off for doctor’s
appointments, chiropractor and physical therapist, and sit/stand workstation, which
allowed employee to adjust computer height electronically, extensive medical leave,
did not violate the ADA); O’Grady v. Zurich Holding Co. of America, 12 Fed. Appx.
96, 98 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding employer made reasonable accommodations under
ADA by “assigning [employee] to a new position as a data input specialist when she
could not handle her workload as a secretary, offering her new office equipment,
ergonomically altering her workstation, and allowing her a paid hour of cumulative
exercise periods in addition to her regular breaks and lunch period”); Wernick v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of
employee’s claims because employer reasonably accommodated employee by
20
21

1/13/2004 7:53 AM

234

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:225

providing her with ergonomic furniture and allowing her to move around and
stretch periodically); Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of county and county sheriff for adjustments
made in response to employee’s complaints that reasonably accommodated employee
as a matter of law, which included restructuring the courthouse security room,
where sheriff built a platform and later lowered room’s video monitors, installing
mini-blinds to minimize glare, purchasing ergonomic chair and modifying work
schedule).
23 See, e.g., Ruhle v. Hous. Auth., 54 Fed. Appx. 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2002) (directing
entrance of judgment for city employer that had reasonably accommodated
employee by making him a full-time lobby monitor which he kept for several years
until he took a laborer’s position); Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir.
2002) (reassigning nurse to clerical position that gave her the same net after-tax
salary as she had earned as a nurse, though with fewer fringe benefits and fewer
career advantages, was a reasonable accommodation); Harris v. Circuit Court, 21
Fed. Appx. 431, 432 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding municipal employer’s holding open
for one year position of employee who had to take leave of absence for cancer
treatment was reasonable accommodation); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel,
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing employee to find means to make
bank deposits other than driving herself to bank would not impose undue hardship
on employer); McCrary v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Association Local 11, 18
Fed. Appx. 281, 283 (6th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with district court’s dismissal of
employee’s case where the state human services department made reasonable
efforts to accommodate employee’s sleep disorder “by allowing him to travel with his
co-workers, encouraging him to apply for other positions and offering him disability
retirement”); Selenke v. Medical Imaging of Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249, 1262 (10th
Cir. 2001) (determining that former employer acted reasonably in implementing
modifications of its offices to provide for better ventilation in mammography dark
room for employee with sinusitis, granting employee’s leave requests, providing her
with respiration mask and offering her alternative position in mobile unit); Gronne
v. Apple Bank for Savings, 1 Fed. Appx. 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding employer’s
offer to accommodate employee’s disability, which prevented her from climbing
stairs or driving by “not assigning any duties which would require her to climb
stairs and paying one-half the cost of a private car service to and from work on days
when friends or family members could not drive her” reasonable under the ADA)
(internal quotations omitted); Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 623
(5th Cir. 2000) (noting employee failed to provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate
that the employer denied transfer requests on the basis of his disability);
Hennenfent v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., 164 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
clinic extended reasonable accommodation within meaning of ADA to physician
where it provided him with reduced work schedules, extended leaves of absence, and
backup physicians to assist him with his on call duties). But see Lamb v. Qualex,
Inc., 33 Fed. Appx. 49, 59 (4th Cir. 2002) (requesting part-time work accommodation
by account service representative who was suffering from depression which
rendered him incapable of working full-time was not reasonable under ADA because
employer had no part-time positions and could not have accepted employee in parttime role without hiring additional employees to make up the difference); Lucas v.
W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to require
employer to reassign employee to customer service representative position to
reasonably accommodate his back injury under ADA where there were no vacancies
in that position and reassigning employee to such position would have constituted a
promotion); Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding
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Reasonable accommodation is constrained by, among others,
the undue hardship defense, which bars accommodations that
require significant difficulty or expense when considered in light
of such factors as “the nature and cost of the accommodation
needed,” “the overall financial resources of the facility” involved
or of the employer, “the type of operation or operations” of the
employer,24 and the potential disruption to other workers and
the production process.25
B.

Rawls’s Justice as Fairness: The 2001 Reformulation

Getting Rawls right is important. Rawls is often cited in
legal literature,26 and legal scholars have applied his
methodology to a wide range of issues including welfare rights,
tax policy, campaign finance, and employment discrimination
law.27 Rawls first published his groundbreaking A Theory of
hospital not required to allow nurse with back disability to engage in job-sharing as
a reasonable accommodation for her to perform the essential functions of her job).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000).
25 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(p) (1993) (providing, for example, that
“[a]lthough the individual [with a disabling visual impairment] may be able to
perform the job in bright lighting, the nightclub will probably be able to
demonstrate that that particular accommodation, though inexpensive, would impose
an undue hardship if the bright lighting would destroy the ambience of the
nightclub”).
26 For example, Rawls was cited in over 500 articles in 2001 (12/8/02 Westlaw
search “DA(AFT 12/31/2000) & Rawls” yielded 567 articles).
27 See generally Robert P. Burns, Rawls and the Principles of Welfare Law, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 184 (1989) (rejecting Rawls’s theory as it applies to welfare rights);
Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: A Rawlsian
Approach, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1301 (1997) (examining the viability of the postcolonial state in Africa along the precepts of Rawls’s theory of political liberalism);
Eric Freedman, Campaign Finance and the First Amendment: A Rawlsian Analysis,
85 IOWA L. REV. 1065 (2000) (arguing that, using the framework provided by Rawls,
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that deals with campaign finance is flawed); W.
Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with
Disabilities and John Rawls’s Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295 (1992)
(critiquing the essential-functions test using a Rawlsian analysis); Walter C. Long,
Appeasing a God: Rawlsian Analysis of Herrera v. Collins and a Substantive Due
Process Right to Innocent Life, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215 (1994) (using Rawls’s
philosophy to determine whether there exists a substantive due process right to
innocent life); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (analyzing welfare
rights using Rawls’s theories); Charles R. O’Kelley Jr., Rawls, Justice, and the
Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REV. 1 (1981) (analyzing tax policies in light of Rawls’s
original position); Mark S. Stein, Rawls on Redistribution to the Disabled, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 997 (1998) (considering the question of redistribution to the disabled
from a Rawlsian perspective, and arguing that Rawls’s response to the issue is
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Justice in 1971, and subsequent development of his concept of
justice as fairness is well known.28 I will give a brief restatement
of his theory, focusing on the modifications contained in Political
Liberalism29 and responses to critiques of same, and Rawls’s
recent and final reformulation in Theory of Justice: A
Restatement.30
1.

The Basic Structure as Subject

Rawls addresses his theory to the “basic structure” of a
property-owning democratic society31 defined as the background
social framework of the main social and political institutions,
such as an independent judiciary, a system of property rights,
the structure of economy, and the conception of family.32 Rawls
takes the basic structure as his subject because of its “profound
and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its

unconvincing); Jesse Furman, Note, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of
Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L. J. 1197
(1997) (arguing that Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” is characterized by the
same ambivalence as that in the paradox of disenfranchisement between toleration
and exclusion).
28 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY]. Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has continued to evolve since the
publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT]; JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]; John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223
(1985) [hereinafter Rawls, Justice as Fairness].
29 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 28.
30 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28. In this work, Rawls reviews his other
major writings on justice as fairness, including A Theory of Justice (1971), Justice as
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical (1985), and Political Liberalism (1993), and
recasts the theory as a form of political liberalism, rather than as a comprehensive
liberal theory. According to his student and friend Professor Samuel Freeman,
“[Rawls] resisted publishing his collected papers; he said he saw them as
opportunities to experiment with ideas, which would later be revised or rejected in a
book.” Samuel Freeman, John Rawls, Friend and Teacher, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Dec. 13, 2002, at B12.
31 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 135–79. In this chapter, Rawls
clarifies his preference for property-owning democracy over laissez faire capitalism,
welfare-state capitalism, state socialism with a common economy, and a liberal
(democratic) socialism on the basis of four evaluative questions: are its institutions
right and just, are they designed to realize the society’s goals, can the citizens be
relied upon to comply with the just institutions and its rules, and are tasks assigned
to positions in a way that encourages competency. Id. at 136.
32 Id. at 10; see also John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, 14 AM. PHIL.
Q. 159, 159 (1977).
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institutions”33 and because preservation and regulation of fair
background conditions is a necessary, overarching precondition
to rules that reduce the inequalities in the lives of individuals
caused by class, endowments and opportunities, and chance. 34
The basic structure includes institutions that “assign basic
rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that
arises from social cooperation over time.”35 This includes the
political constitution;36 federal legislation, presumably including
anti-discrimination laws such as the ADA;37 and possibly
common law decisions with large scale or systemic impact.38 It
does not include small scale or personal decisions and
agreements or international law and policy.39 The ADA should
be considered part of the basic structure because “antidiscrimination laws are an indispensable component of a basic
structure that justly distributes the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation.” 40
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 55.
Id. at 39–40.
35 Id. at 10.
36 Id.
37 See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of AntiDiscrimination Laws, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 145, 149 (2000) (“Egalitarians argue
that anti-discrimination laws are an indispensable component of a basic structure
that justly distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”).
38 Rawls does not address whether the common law falls within the basic
structure. However, Professor Heidi Li Feldman has argued that although the
common law seems “to fall both inside and outside the basic structure,” common law
decisions can be considered part of the Rawlsian basic structure when they have
“large-scale, systematic effects.” Heidi Li Feldman, Rawls’ Political Constructivism
as a Judicial Heuristic: A Response to Professor Allen, 51 FLA. L. REV. 67, 76–78
(1999).
39 For example:
One should not assume in advance that principles that are reasonable and
just for the basic structure are also reasonable and just for institutions
associations, and social practices generally. While the principles of justice
as fairness impose limits on these social arrangements within the basic
structure, the basic structure and the associations and social forms within
it are each governed by distinct principles in view of their different aims
and purposes and their peculiar nature and special requirements. Justice
as fairness is a political, not a general, conception of justice: it applies first
to the basic structure and sees these other questions of local justice and
also questions of global justice (what I call the law of peoples) as calling for
separate consideration on their merits.
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 11.
40 See Choudhry, supra note 32, at 149. Query: Are some aspects of disability
policy arguably local and therefore outside of the scope of Rawls’s two principles of
justice? See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 11 (“The principles of justice to
33
34
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The Two Principles of Justice

Against the backdrop of a fair basic structure,41 Rawls turns
to the two principles of justice that provide a method for
identifying rules that are “most appropriate for a democratic
society that not only professes but wants to take seriously the
idea that citizens are free and equal, and tries to realize that
idea in its main institutions.”42 First, “[e]ach person has the
same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all.”43 Basic liberties include freedom of thought,
liberty of conscience, political liberties such as the right to vote
and participate in politics, freedom of association, rights and
liberties relating to physical and psychological integrity of the
individual, and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of
law.44 This “principle of liberty” is lexically prior to the second
principle, so generally basic liberties can be restricted only for
the sake of other basic liberties.45
Second, any social and economic inequalities must be both
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity—the “principle of fair opportunity”—
and to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society—the “difference principle”.46
The principle of fair
opportunity goes beyond simple formal equality, as it means that
in addition to public and social positions being open to everyone,
everyone should have a fair chance to meet the qualifications for
such positions. In other words, “those who have the same level
of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their
social class of origin,” and there should be “roughly the same
prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly

be followed directly by associations and institutions within the basic structure we
may call principles of local justice.” (citing JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE (1992))).
41 Because the two principles of justice are meant to be applied only in the
presence of a fair basic structure, it is important to know if the basic structure is
fair in a Rawlsian sense. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that the basic
structure is fair.
42 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 39.
43 Id. at 42.
44 Id. at 44.
45 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 220.
46 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 42–48.

1/13/2004 7:53 AM

2003]

SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED JUSTICE

239

motivated and endowed.”47 These two parts of the second
principle are also ordered lexically so that the difference
principle can be applied only when both the first principle of
justice and the principle of fair opportunity are met.48
3.

The Original Position

Rawls maintains that the two principles of justice described
above are legitimate because they would be chosen by decisionmakers in a hypothetical “original position” of fairness and
neutrality. Decision makers in the original position are defined
as rational, meaning that they are able to consider and assess
various alternatives in light of their own sense of justice but not
prone to what Rawls terms “special psychologies” such as envy,
spite, acute risk aversion or the will to control others,49 equally
able to participate in the decision-making process50 and to prefer
more rather than less primary social goods.51 They are also
assumed to possess “public reason” or “the plain truths now
common and available to citizens generally,” including common
sense and general knowledge such as the basic principles of
human psychology, social organization, political affairs, and
economic theory.52
In contrast, when it comes to the types of knowledge that
might enable self interested or self centered decision making, the
parties are imagined as behind a heavy “veil of ignorance.”53
Thus, they do not know the shape or status of their own society;
their class or social status; their good or bad luck in the
distribution of natural assets and disabilities; their own
psychological traits such as optimism or fear of risk; or even
their own comprehensive conception of the good, whether based
on philosophy or religion.54 As a result, “[t]hey do not know how
Id. at 44.
Id. at 61.
49 Id. at 87. At least one author has criticized Rawls’s “[a]ssuming evil away” as
a major flaw in his theory. Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 211, 213 (1994).
50 They “all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each
can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on.” RAWLS,
THEORY, supra note 28, at 17.
51 Id. at 123.
52 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 90; see also RAWLS, THEORY, supra
note 28, at 119.
53 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 118.
54 Id. at 11, 118; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 15.
47
48
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the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and
they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of
general considerations.”55
4.

A Political Liberalism and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism

One critical development in Rawls’s theory of justice as
fairness is the recasting of his theory as a political or noncomprehensive form of liberalism rather than a comprehensive
liberal doctrine. Rawls describes theories of liberalism as
“comprehensive” if they are anchored to a deep, foundational
philosophical theory and are meant to apply in all spheres, not
just the political. In Political Liberalism, Rawls (re)defines his
theory as “political”—not part of a more comprehensive moral,
religious, or philosophical doctrine and intended to apply only to
the political sphere of a particular type of society, the
constitutional democracy.56
Notwithstanding the political nature of Rawls’s theory, he
argues that multiple and even conflicting comprehensive
doctrines are still present in a liberal democracy because each
person’s idea of justice and the good may be based on personallyheld doctrines, comprehensive or not. Rawls embraces those
doctrines that are different and incompatible—but still
reasonable—as the “fact of reasonable pluralism.”57
A
comprehensive doctrine is reasonable if it reflects the belief that
society is a fair system of cooperation over time among free and
equal citizens.58 Conversely, a comprehensive doctrine that
opposes liberal democratic forms of society is by definition
55 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 118. The original position is not meant to
describe and explain how people actually think or act. Instead, Rawls imagines
actors in the original position “according to how we want to model rational
representatives of free and equal citizens.” RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at
81. The veil of ignorance is imposed so we can imagine how the actors would make
decisions based on a shared (but limited) set of general facts and in the absence of
culturally-dependent motivations such as envy, the desire to dominate, or extreme
risk aversion. Id. at 81, 87. As a consequence, it does not matter that real people
living in a culture do not (and perhaps cannot) think like the actors in the original
position.
56 Erin Kelly, Editor’s Foreword to RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at xi–
xii (discussing development of political liberalism from Justice as Fairness: Political
Not Metaphysical to Political Liberalism to Restatement); see also PATRICK NEAL,
LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 98–101 (1997). For a discussion of Rawls’s
“practical turn,” see id. at 99–132.
57 Erin Kelly, Editor’s Foreword to RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at xi.
58 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 15–22.
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unreasonable and is excluded from the Rawlsian reasonable
pluralism.
It follows that a comprehensive doctrine that
proposed that basic rights and political power be distributed
according to race, sex, or ethnicity should be excluded as
unreasonable.59
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, individuals may form
an “overlapping consensus” by affirming the same political
conception of justice but for different reasons.60
This is
significant because Rawls argues that against a backdrop of fair
institutions, a political liberalism supported by an overlapping
consensus of reasonable doctrines will lead to stability: “[G]iven
the existence of a reasonably well ordered constitutional regime,
the family of basic political values expressed by its principles
and ideals have sufficient weight to override all other values that
may normally come into conflict with them.”61
II. A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO DISABILITY-BASED
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Rawls’s theory allows us to evaluate the actions of the state,
including formulation of law from the point of view of the state,
and to evaluate an existing rule against the two principles of
justice to reveal the values it embodies. Such an analysis may
not establish what the ADA should say, but it may suggest a way
to evaluate what the ADA does say: “The role of a political
conception of justice . . . is not to say exactly how these questions
are to be settled, but to set out a framework of thought within
which they can be approached.”62
Rawls did not necessarily intend for the two principles of
justice to be applied to legislation such as the ADA or to the
Supreme Court cases interpreting it. In fact, he explains that
the veil of ignorance is slowly lifted through each stage of
decisionmaking:
The principles of justice are adopted and applied in a four-stage
sequence. In the first stage, the parties adopt the principles of
justice behind a veil of ignorance. Limitations on knowledge
59 See Marilyn Friedman, John Rawls and the Political Coercion of
Unreasonable People, in THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16, 27 (Victorian
Davion & Clark Wolf eds., 2000).
60 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 32.
61 Id. at 183.
62 Id. at 12.
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available to the parties are progressively relaxed in the next
three stages: the stage of the constitutional convention, the
legislative stage in which laws are enacted as the constitution
allows and as the principles of justice require and permit, and
the final stage in which the rules are applied by administrators
and followed by the citizens generally and the constitution and
laws are interpreted by members of the judiciary. At this last
stage, everyone has complete access to all the facts. 63

Nonetheless, we can still use Rawls’s methodology to shed
light on the issue of judicial interpretation of the ADA in this
context.
Accordingly, this section will apply Rawls’s
methodology to the issue of disability-based discrimination,
specifically Title I of the ADA.
A.

Getting to Rawls’s Second Principle of Justice

1.

Putting Aside an Argument on Disability and the Principle
of Liberty

There may be an argument that certain disability issues
relate to basic liberties or “constitutional essentials”64 and are
therefore lexically prior to the two parts of the second principle
of justice. Consider, example, how disability impacts practices
such as state-sanctioned involuntary sterilization,65 termination
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
65 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L. J. 806, 807 (characterizing
laws which authorize the sterilization of persons with disabilities as “improperly
limit[ing] the freedom of some persons who may be capable of making their own
reproductive choices”); Joe Zumpano-Canto, Nonconsensual Sterilization of the
Mentally Disabled in North Carolina: An Ethics Critique of the Statutory Standard
and Its Judicial Interpretation, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 99 (1996)
(arguing “sterilization without a full investigation of the [disabled] individual’s
interest in marriage unethically invades sexual autonomy”); Robert Randal Adler,
Note, Estate of C.W.: A Pragmatic Approach to the Involuntary Sterilization of the
Mentally Disabled, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1323, 1361 (1996) (arguing that the “unceasing
supervision” of a person with a disability constitutes “an ongoing infraction on her
fundamental constitutional right to privacy”); James C. Dugan, Note, The Conflict
Between “Disabling” and “Enabling” Paradigms in Law: Sterilization, the
Developmentally Disabled and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 507, 518–19 (1993) (characterizing the Court’s decision dealing
with the privacy rights of people with disabilities as “disabling”); Winiviere Sy,
Note, The Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual
Sexual Activity, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 545 passim (2001) (discussing a disabled
person’s right to engage in consensual sexual activity while in an institution as an
63
64
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of parental rights,66 or limitations on the right to vote.67
Notwithstanding that argument, this Article will focus on the
links between Title I of the ADA which addresses disabilitybased discrimination in employment and the two parts of
Rawls’s second principle of justice.68
2.

An Initial Position on Disability and the Veil of Ignorance

Rawls specifically excludes people with certain severe
disabilities from the construct of the original position:
[A] person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully
cooperating member of society over a complete life . . . .for our

aspect of the right to privacy and sexual autonomy). I would like to thank the
students in my Law & Disability seminar, Fall 2002, for their work on these three
issues which helped me to see them in the context of Rawls’s methodology.
66 See, e.g., Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act
to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 396 (2000) (arguing that the fundamental
right to procreate “appl[ies] to all persons: ‘mentally disabled,’ physically disabled,
and married and unmarried alike”); Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of
Happiness: Parents with Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16
LAW & INEQ. 153, 153–54 (1998) (arguing that the right to establish a home and
raise children is among the most basic of civil rights and that the ADA offers
persons with disabilities a vehicle for enforcing those rights).
67 See, e.g., Kay Schriner & Lisa A. Ochs, Creating the Disabled Citizen: How
Massachusetts Disenfranchised People under Guardianship, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 481
passim (2001) (discussing how states have disenfranchised persons with disabilities,
thereby interfering with the fundamental right to vote); Kay Schriner et al.,
Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive
and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 437, 446–47 (2000)
(discussing what the authors label as “contradictory” federal and state laws which
prohibit persons with disabilities from voting); Boris Feldman, Note, Mental
Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1644 (1979) (arguing that
mental disability restrictions on the right to vote violate the equal protection clause
because “efforts to disfranchise irrational persons infringe upon fundamental rights
without furthering a compelling state interest”).
68 Title I of the ADA is an appropriate subject within disability law and policy
as it deals with distributive, and not allocative, justice. Distributive justice refers to
the measures by which “the institutions of the basic structure [are] regulated as one
unified scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient, and productive system of
social cooperation can be maintained over time, from one generation to the next.”
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 50. It is a purely procedural concept, with
no required result. Id. In contrast, allocative justice concerns itself with the
allocation of “a given bundle of commodities . . . among various individuals whose
particular needs, desires, and preferences are known.” Id. Rawls rejects allocative
justice as incompatible with fair system of cooperation over time, because there can
be no criterion for a just distribution apart from the just background institutions
and the entitlements that arise from actually working through the two principles of
justice. Id. at 50–51.
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purposes . . . I leave aside permanent disabilities or mental
disorders so severe as to prevent persons from being normal
and fully cooperating members of society in the usual sense.69

Rawls attempts to explain or justify the exclusion of certain
people with certain mental disabilities in Political Liberalism:
[S]ince the fundamental problem of justice concerns the
relations among those who are full and active participants in
society, and directly or indirectly associated together over the
course of a whole life, it is reasonable to assume that everyone
has physical needs and psychological capacities within some
normal range. Thus the problem of special health care and how
to treat the mentally defective are aside. If we can work out a
viable theory for the normal range, we can attempt to handle
these other cases later.70

Beyond that, Rawls does not give explicit consideration to
disability within his theory of justice as fairness.
Notwithstanding Rawls’s brief and unsatisfying treatment of
disability, some authors have argued that disability fares well
under a Rawlsian analysis because, similar to the decision
makers in the original position, no one knows if or when he or
she might become disabled:
The ADA fares remarkably well under a Rawlsian analysis, for
the reality of disability closely corresponds to the hypothetical
Rawlsian state of nature. At any given moment the majority of
human beings have no disability, at least not as the term is
used in the ADA. However, nobody knows what the future
holds for them. They may become disabled later today, next
year, in the next decade, or not at all.71

69 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 28, at 233, 234; see also RAWLS,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 170 (“To begin, I put aside the more extreme cases
of persons with such grave disabilities that they can never be normal contributing
members of social cooperation.”).
70 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 272 n.10; see also EVA FEDER KITTAY,
LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 80 (1999).
71 David J. Popeil, The Debate Over the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Question of Economics or Justice?, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527, 531
(1995); see also Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, in AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 174, 181 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Robert
A. Bohrer, A Rawlsian Approach to Solving the Problem of Genetic Discrimination
in Toxic Workplaces, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 751–52 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 DUKE L.J. 1, 26–27 (1996).
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Assuming that Rawlsian decision makers could consider
disability, how would Rawls’s principles of justice apply to the
issue of disability, particularly disability-based discrimination in
the workplace?
B.

The Principle of Fair Opportunity

1.

Rawls and “Irrational” Discrimination

The principle of fair opportunity goes beyond simple formal
equality and ensures that everyone is afforded a fair chance to
meet the qualifications for important political and social
positions. It requires that “those who have the same level of
talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their
social class of origin.”72
Prospects for success should be
determined by factors within the individual’s control as defined
by Rawls, such as ambition or effort, and not those that are
“ ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view.’ ”73
As traditionally conceived, employment discrimination can
be rational, meaning based on a real or perceived trait that is
relevant to job performance, or “irrational,” meaning based on a
real or perceived trait that is irrelevant to job performance.74
The principle of fair opportunity corresponds with the traditional
model of antidiscrimination law, the prohibition of so-called
“irrational” discrimination. Irrational discrimination occurs
when an employer is motivated by false assumptions,
stereotypes, or prejudice on the basis of non-relevant traits
instead of by the actual abilities of a particular individual.75

RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 44.
Choudhry, supra note 37, at 150 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 15 (1971)).
74 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1992)
(distinguishing rational from irrational stereotype or proxy discrimination); Gray,
supra note 27, at 318 (noting social and sexual prejudice are characterized by Rawls
as “irrational” and commenting that “stereotypes are simply irrelevant
characteristics that must be discarded so that the ‘essential person’ can compete on
the basis of his natural and cultivated skills”).
75 See Norman Daniels, Mental Disabilities, Equal Opportunity, and the ADA,
in MENTAL DISORDERS, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 281, 283 (Richard J. Bonnie
& John Monahan eds., 1997); Alexander, supra note 74, at 169; Choudhry, supra
note 37, at 148.
72
73
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As Professor Sujit Choudhry has observed, Rawls’s theory
would characterize irrational discrimination as unjust because
“its purpose is to deny persons access to a material good or
opportunity on the basis of reasons that are irrelevant to the
distribution of that material good or opportunity.”76 Rawls’s
theory would similarly characterize the use of pernicious
stereotypes as “yet another way in which circumstance—
. . . membership in a class of persons whose abilities or
qualifications are on average below the requisite standard—
instead of one’s choices is allowed to determine distributive
shares.”77
In the specific context of discrimination in
employment:
[S]tereotypes are simply irrelevant characteristics that must be
discarded so that the “essential person” can compete on the
basis of his natural and cultivated skills. . . . Laws like [T]itle
VII strip away these irrational “accidents” or prejudice from the
substantial person, but “leave[] the organization of work . . . to
the operation of the marketplace.”78

2.

The ADA’s “Regarded as” Disabled and “Record of”
Disability Categories

Disability-based discrimination may be based on a real or
perceived disability that is not relevant to job performance or on
a real or perceived disability that is relevant to job performance
to some degree.79
In the disability context, irrational
discrimination occurs when an employer is motivated by false
assumptions, stereotypes, or prejudice related to disability
instead of by the actual abilities of a particular individual with a
real or perceived disability.
Congress clearly intended the ADA to prohibit irrational
discrimination, as it found that people with disabilities have
been disadvantaged, at least in part, “from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual[‘s]
ability . . . to participate in, and contribute, to society.”80 Indeed,
Choudhry, supra note 37, at 152–53.
Id. at 157.
78 See Gray, supra note 27, at 318 (alteration in original).
79 See generally David Olsky, Note, Let Them Eat Cake: Diabetes and the
Americans with Disabilities Act After Sutton, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1829 (2002)
(analyzing rational and irrational employment discrimination against people with
diabetes).
80 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527
76
77
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even prior to the ADA, the Supreme Court recognized that
workers harmed by false assumptions about disability should be
protected from discrimination in the workplace because of their
real or perceived impairments.81 Accordingly, by prohibiting
discrimination not related to actual ability, at least one of the
purposes of the ADA was to allow people with disabilities to
compete on the same terms as people without disabilities:
[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those
opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous,
and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.82

Textually, the ADA’s prohibition of discrimination against
an individual “regarded as” disabled, whether or not he or she is
actually disabled, or having a “record of” a disability
discrimination indicates that the ADA seeks to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of stereotype, stigma, and myth.83
Consider an employer that avoids rehiring workers who have
sustained injuries on the job because of the employer’s general
fear of re-injury. The ADA prohibits that employer from refusing
to rehire a healed worker—a worker who is in fact able to safely
perform the essential functions of his job—just because of the
employer’s general fear of re-injury.84 It also prohibits an
employer for a parcel delivery service who falsely believes that
drivers with monocular vision are always unsafe from refusing to
hire a monocular driver notwithstanding his actual driving
performance.85
U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
81 See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (finding school teacher fired
solely because of her past record of and believed continuing susceptibility to
tuberculosis is “disabled” under Rehabilitation Act).
82 Anita Silvers, “Defective” Agents: Equality, Difference and the Tyranny of the
Normal, 25 J. SOC. PHIL. 154, 166 (1994) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. S7422, at S7423
(1990); 136 CONG. REC. H2599, at H2640 (1990)).
83 See Gray, supra note 27, at 317.
84 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(r) (2003). But see Munoz v. H & M
Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 596, 606–08 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
85 See EEOC v. UPS, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, UPS had a corporate-wide policy
prohibiting drivers with monocular vision that was not based on a Department of
Transportation safety standard or any actual driving records, and was in fact
mistaken as some monocular drivers can retain themselves to be as safe as average
binocular drivers. Id. at 1157–58. Note that the court framed the question as one of
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The Difference Principle

As shown above, the experiential-social approach of the
“history of” and “regarded as” prongs of the definition of
disability address irrational discrimination by focusing on the
social context that creates discrimination or disadvantage,
rather than on the real or perceived impairment. This model,
however, does not work well when the discrimination is based
upon actual disability that does affect job performance to some
degree. This situation calls for application of the difference
principle—that social and economic inequalities must be
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality or opportunity and be for the greatest benefit of the
least-advantaged members of society.
1.

People with Disabilities as “Least Advantaged”

According to Rawls, the “least advantaged” are those with
the fewest primary goods. Although income and wealth have
been considered the central primary goods,86 Rawls defines
primary goods as the things that all free and equal people need
as citizens, including the basic liberties described above: freedom
of movement and free choice of occupation among varied
opportunities, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of
authority and responsibility, income and wealth, and the social
bases of self respect.87 All of these are social primary goods,
which are under the direct control of the basic structure. In
contrast, natural primary goods such as health and vigor,
intelligence, and imagination are not under the direct control of
the basic structure. The two principles of justice are meant to
apply to social primary goods, not natural primary goods.88

first impression—whether a blanket safety standard that allegedly discriminated in
hiring of employees on the basis of disability should be evaluated under the
traditional business-necessity defense. Id. at 1161–63. Although the factual
similarity is striking, the Supreme Court in Murphy addressed a distinct question—
the interpretation of “disability.” See Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1999).
86 See Stein, supra note 27, at 999 (noting that Rawls “focuses almost
exclusively on the primary goods of income and wealth”).
87 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 59–60. Social bases of self respect is
understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to
have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends
with self-confidence.
88 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 54–55.
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Although not specifically considered so by Rawls, people
with disabilities can be seen as the “least advantaged.”89 The
approach is intuitively appealing because, unlike Title VII which
applies to all individuals,90 the ADA applies only to qualified
individuals with disabilities.91
Essentially, everyone has
standing to bring suit under Title VII for discrimination on the
basis of his or her race, national origin, gender, or religion, but
only individuals who meet the statutory definition of disabled
can bring suit under the ADA.92 Thus, the structure of the ADA
creates a well-defined group for analysis.
In addition, as argued by several authors, strong factual
arguments can be made that people with disabilities comprise a
least, or at a minimum a less, favored group in the Rawlsian
sense, as the available research shows that people with
disabilities are disproportionately poor.93
People with
disabilities comprise the largest population of people living in
poverty94 and experience a poverty rate estimated at three times
that of the rest of the population.95
89 See Stein, supra note 27, at 1013. However, Stein concludes that if people
with disabilities are considered the most disadvantaged class, distribution of income
and wealth will be plagued by issues of insatiability and uncompensability. Id. at
1012; see also Mashaw, supra note 49, at 220 (noting that “[t]he Rawlsian difference
principle that requires social arrangements constructed such that they optimize the
position of the least advantaged might provide a strong prima facie claim for special
efforts on behalf of the disabled in all walks of life”) (footnote omitted).
90 For instance, Title VII permits an assertion of a claim by a person who is a
victim of discrimination on the basis of a characteristic which all individuals are
presumed to have—race, color, national origin, sex, religion.
91 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2000).
92 One consequence is that there is no possibility of so-called “reverse
discrimination” suits under the ADA—a nondisabled individual cannot bring an
action claiming that he or she is not being offered an accommodation that is being
offered to a person with a disability.
93 See Gray, supra note 27, at 315; Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (1998).
94 See Burgdorf, supra note 19, at 422 (stating that the rate of poverty among
people with disabilities is more than twice that of other Americans); LOUIS HARRIS
& ASSOCS., N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 8 (2000),
available at www.nod.org (last visited June 14, 2003) (reporting the income gap as
19% between people with and people without disabilities).
95 Weber, supra note 93, at 127–28 (citing Law Banning Job Bias Against
Disabled Expected to Have a Significant Impact, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), July 19, 1992, at 24A)).
Unfortunately, people with disabilities are “disproportionately amongst the
poorest of the poor” worldwide. Rebecca Yao, Chronic Poverty and Disability,
Background Paper Number 4, 5 (2001), at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/cp4.htm
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Closely linked to the issue of poverty, and particularly
relevant to analysis of the employment title of the ADA, is the
lack of what Rawls terms the “free choice of occupation among
varied opportunities” for people with disabilities. In the years
immediately following the passage of the ADA, “unemployment
levels for persons with disabilities range[d] from fifty to ninety
percent.”96 Current available data indicates that people with
disabilities are still failing to achieve a noticeable expansion of
employment opportunities, and post-ADA research has
“consistently” demonstrated that people with disabilities “have
lower average wages and lower employment rates than nondisabled workers.”97
Federal aid programs do not adequately address this gap.
Although the Social Security Disability Insurance and
Supplemental Security Income programs guarantee “a
subsistence income to persons with total, long-term disabilities,”
only employment “offers individuals enough money to participate
fully in the life of the community, or the status and satisfaction
that comes from economic self-sufficiency.”98 Nor can the
conspicuous underemployment of people with disabilities be
attributed to choice. To the contrary, a survey cited in the
legislative history of the ADA reported that two-thirds of
working age persons with disabilities say that they are not
working, and 66% of those not working say that they want to

(last visited April 6, 2003). “Whilst not all disabled people are poor, evidence points
to a disproportionate number of disabled people in all countries being amongst those
living in extreme or chronic poverty.” Id. at 8. Moreover, the international research
demonstrates that disability and poverty are mutually reinforcing—“disability adds
to the risk of poverty, and conditions of poverty increase the risk of disability.” Ann
Elwan, Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature: Social Protection
Discussion
Paper
No.
9932,
at
i
(1999),
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid= 000
094946_0011210532099 (last visited April 6, 2003).
96 Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990–1993, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 853, 913 (1994).
97 Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 41 (1997). [UTL]But see LOUIS HARRIS &
ASSOCS., supra note 94, at 7 (noting as of 2000, 56% of people with disabilities who
reported that they were able to work were working, compared to 46% in 1986).
98 Pendo, supra note 11, at 1215–16; see also Kavka, supra note 71, at 175
(“[T]he right to work is a right to employment; it is a right to earn income, not
simply a right to receive a certain income stream or the resources necessary to
attain a certain level of welfare.”).
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work.99 A more recent survey by the Harris polling organization
reported that 67% of people ages 16 to 64 who identified
themselves as disabled and unemployed said that they would
prefer to be working.100
As Rawls’s focus on the goods of income and wealth in the
advantage analysis is predominant but not exclusive,101 it is
worth noting that strong arguments can be made in reference to
the other bases of advantage. Overall, “[p]eople with disabilities
experience ‘the most extreme unemployment, poverty,
psychological abuse, and physical deprivation experienced by one
segment of our society.’ ”102 As noted above, many disability
issues relate to the basic liberties, such as state sanctioned
involuntary sterilization, termination of parental rights, or
limitations of the right to vote on the basis of disability.103 In
addition to disproportionately high levels of poverty and
underemployment, people with disabilities have also been faced
with challenges relating to freedom of movement and

99 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314
(citing ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO
THE MAINSTREAM 50).
100 LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., supra note 94, at 7. “A recent survey in a large
state found that 72% of persons with disabilities who are unemployed want to
work.” Weber, supra note 93, at 128 n.20 (citing Minette McGhee, Justice is Blind—
For One Day: Court Gets Lesson on Disability, CHI. SUN–TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at
22).
101 Gray, supra note 27, at 312. For example:
[Rawls] also suggests an alternative selection of the least advantaged as
those with “fixed natural characteristics” upon which the unequal
distribution of goods is founded. Finally, Rawls makes it plain that it is not
necessary “to think of the least advantaged as literally the worst off
individuals[s]” but rather as a plausible embodiment of this “practicable”
and necessary concept. Under these conditions, and by either the socioeconomic or natural-disadvantage standard, people with disabilities can
constitute Rawls’s least advantaged group.
Id. (citations omitted).
102 Id. at 315 (quoting Hearings on S. 933, To Establish a Clear and
Comprehensive Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 101st Cong. 19 (1989) (statement of Justin Dart, Chairperson Task Force
on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities)); see also Burgdorf,
supra note 19, at 415 (“ ‘By almost any definition, Americans with disabilities are
uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less well
educated and have much less social life, have fewer amenities and have a lower
level of self-satisfaction than other Americans.’ ” (quoting Senate Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, S. HRG. 166, 101st Cong. 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor))).
103 See supra notes 65–67.
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transportation,104 underrepresentation with regard to powers
and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and
responsibility,105 and denial of the social bases of self respect.
Rawls defines the social bases of self-respect as those
aspects of basic institutions that are normally essential if
citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and
to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence.106 Rawls
considers self-respect or self-esteem to be one of the most
important primary goods, because without it nothing may seem
worth doing.107 Although Rawls’s concept of self-esteem or selfrespect is not concisely or consistently defined throughout his
work,108 it seems consistent to include participation in the
economic life of a society through employment within his
concept:
[G]iven actual human psychology, self-respect, is—to a
considerable
degree—dependent
upon
other
people’s
affirmation of one’s own worth. And in modern advanced
societies, employment, earnings and professional success are,
for better of worse, positively correlated with social
assessments of an individual’s value. Further, beyond the
reactions of other people, work and career identifications form
significant parts of some people’s conceptions of themselves and
their own worth; hence these identifications may contribute
104 See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., supra note 94, at 11 (stating that people with
disabilities are three times more likely than people without disabilities to consider
inadequate transportation a problem); S. REP. NO. 99–400, at 2 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2328, 2329 (discussing the background of discrimination in
transportation responded to by the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986). See generally
Michael Lewyn, “Thou Shalt Not Put a Stumbling Block Before the Blind”: The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Public Transit for the Disabled, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 1037 (2001); Martha T. McCluskey, Note, Rethinking Equality and Difference:
Disability and Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863 (1988);
Sharon Rennert, Note, All Aboard: Accessible Public Transportation for Disabled
Persons, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 360 (1988).
105 Consider also that in the 1996 presidential election, approximately six out of
ten people with disabilities were registered to vote, compared to almost eight out of
ten people without disabilities, “suggesting that people with disabilities have not
been engaged in the political process at the same rate as people without
disabilities.” LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., supra note 93, at 10.
106 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, at 60.
107 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 386, 387 (stating that “unless our
endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us to maintain the
conviction that they are worthwhile” and that “[w]ithout it nothing may seem worth
doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them”).
108 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY
190–204 (1996) (discussing Rawls’s concept of self-esteem/self-respect).
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directly to the creation and sustenance of self-respect, and their
absence will frequently have the opposite effect.109

2.

Rawls and “Rational” Discrimination

Assuming that people with disabilities could be considered a
least, or at a minimum a less, favored group, application of the
difference principle requires that any social and economic
inequalities be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society. Under Rawls’s theory, disabilities or
impairments are natural inequities that a just society must
compensate for: “[U]ndeserved inequalities call for redress; and
since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are
undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated
for.” 110 Indeed, “in order to treat all persons equally . . . society
must give more attention to those with fewer native assets.”111
Rawls’s treatment of disability shares strong links to the
medical-functional model of disability, wherein a person with a
disability is viewed as innately biologically different and inferior.
Consequently, Rawls’s theory suggests that the best way to help
the disabled person is to use either medicine to cure or
ameliorate the impairment or rehabilitation techniques to enable
the person to cope with or overcome the impairment’s effects.112
In the context of employment discrimination, however, the
difference principle corresponds to the concept of “rational”
discrimination, wherein an employer acts on the basis of an
accurate assessment of the worker’s qualifications and the risks
and benefits of hiring that individual.

Kavka, supra note 71, at 179.
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 86.
111 Id. But see John M. Vande Walle, In the Eye of the Beholder: Issues of
Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA’s Employment Protection for Persons
Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897 (1998) (reasoning that the ADA is
concerned with distributive justice in the Aristotelian sense based on criterion of
possession of a disability, as opposed to most anti-discrimination statutes which are
concerned with corrective justice, but the inclusion of individuals “regarded as”
disabled follows the model of corrective justice, and thus subverts its distributive
justice rationale).
112 See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 28, at 86–87; see also Stein, supra note 27,
at 1001 (applying Rawls’s difference principle, if the most disadvantaged class is
people with disabilities, distribution of income and wealth will be plagued by issues
of insatiability and uncompensability).
109
110
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The ADA’s “Actual” Disability Category and the Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement

As stated above, disability-based discrimination may be
“rational,” meaning based on a real or perceived disability that is
relevant to job performance. For example, consider an employer
who does not want to spend money on new ergonomically-correct
office equipment, and therefore refuses to hire a specific worker
with carpal tunnel syndrome who would in fact require some
specialized equipment.113
Congress intended to prohibit forms of rational
discrimination against people with disabilities.114 The first
prong of the definition of disability—a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities—in conjunction with the reasonable accommodation
requirement, address this form of discrimination as the prong
requires that employers do more than simply treat individuals
with disabilities the same way as other similarly qualified
applicants or workers. Unlike equality of opportunity which
“places no constraints on the processes that determine how jobs
are defined and individuated,”115 the ADA imposes on employers
an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to make it
possible for people with disabilities to perform essential job
functions and to secure equal enjoyment of all terms and
conditions of employers. As the Supreme Court has recognized:
The Act requires preferences in the form of “reasonable
accommodations” that are needed for those with disabilities to
113 Of course, this example is not to suggest that providing reasonable
accommodation is always costly or that the mere presence of an additional cost
renders a decision to reject a worker with disabilities rational. Indeed, “a review of
the available data suggests that the majority of accommodations cost less than $100
per employee.” Pendo, supra note 11, at 1183–84. For a more complete discussion of
the costs of reasonable accommodation, see generally id. and Michael Ashley Stein,
Labor Markets, Rationality and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY. J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 314 (2000).
114 “Congress was relatively clearer about the multifaceted nature of disability
discrimination. Legislators openly acknowledged that disability discrimination may
result not only from invidious animus, but simply from ‘unthinking’ conduct.”
Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent
Mistakes,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 482 (2002) (exploring a tort-based approach to
cases in which an employer that takes a negative employment action against an
employee based on a mistaken belief that the employee is disabled).
115 Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination and Priority, in AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 71, at 18, 23.
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obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without
disabilities automatically enjoy.
By definition a special
“accommodation” requires the employer to treat an employee
with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact
that the difference in treatment violates an employer’s
disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation
beyond the Act’s potential reach. 116

III. A RAWLSIAN ANALYSIS OF RECENT ADA JURISPRUDENCE
In its last several terms, the Supreme Court has
increasingly turned its attention toward the ADA. Indeed,
Justice O’Connor suggested that the term ending June 2002
might be remembered as the “disabilities act term.”117 These
cases spawned a wealth of scholarship, much of it critical,118 and
116 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002). However, the Court
goes on to hold that in the absence of specific circumstances established by the
employee an employer’s showing that the requested accommodation conflicts with
seniority rules is sufficient to show that the accommodation is not reasonable. Id. at
406.
117 Speech by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, March 14, 2002 at Georgetown
University Law Center.
118 The Sutton trilogy on standing is discussed in numerous articles. See
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397,
400 (2000) (suggesting “the criticism of the Court’s ‘disability’ quartet—from both
sides—is overblown”); Amy Maes, The Americans with Disabilities Act—Time to
Measure the Efficacy of This Legislation, 79 MICH. B.J. 1664, 1664–65 (2000) [UTL]
(commenting that the adoption of the restricted definition of disability by Sutton,
Murphy, and Albertson’s “may force out of the courtroom discussion any
consideration of how medications themselves affect major life activities”); Tony R.
Maida, How Judicial Myopia Is Jeopardizing the Protection of People with
HIV/AIDS Under the ADA, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 304 (2001) (arguing that the
Sutton trilogy definition of disability threatens the ADA’s protection of persons with
HIV/AIDS); Stacie E. Barhorst, Note, What Does Disability Mean: The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Aftermath of Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, 48
DRAKE L. REV. 137 passim (1999) (exploring the effects of the Sutton trilogy on the
ADA); Erin K. Barta, Comment, Practical Effects of the Sutton Decision: Mitigation,
Deference, and the EEOC, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV 35, 57–59 (2000) (discussing the
possible practical effects of Sutton on employers); Thad LeVar, Note, Why an
Employer Does Not Have to Answer for Preventing an Employee with a Disability
from Utilizing Corrective Measures: The Relationship Between Mitigation and
Reasonable Accommodation, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 69, 81 (2001) (arguing that an
alternate, single qualification test to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies to bring
an ADA employment discrimination claim, rather than the currently employed
bifurcated qualification test, would close the loophole for employers who prohibit
employees from using mitigating measures to correct disabilities); Lauren J.
McGarity, Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side
Effects Might Be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162–63 (2000)
(arguing that the impact of the Supreme Court’s holding in the Sutton trilogy may
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be significantly narrower than initial interpretations indicate); Sarina Maria
Russotto, Comment, Effects of the Sutton Trilogy, 68 TENN. L. REV. 705, 712–13
(2001) (arguing “[w]hen the Supreme Court decided that mitigating or corrective
measures must be considered to determine if an individual has an ADA disability,
the Court effectively narrowed the protected class of people by identifying different
classes of disabilities”).
The Garrett case is not without its share of commentators. See Pamela
Brandwein, Constitutional Doctrine as Paring Tool: The Struggle for “Relevant”
Evidence in University of Alabama v. Garrett, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 37–38
(2002) (examining the “difficulties involved in translating the social model of
disability into the idiom of constitutional law”); Judith Olans Brown & Wendy E.
Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity & the ADA, 35 U. MICH. L.J.
REFORM 1, 2, 2–16 (2002) (following “the development of the Supreme Court’s
newfound concern for state sovereignty and discuss[ing] its culmination in Garrett”);
Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection
Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1075–1121 (2002)
(providing an overview of state anti-discrimination statutes and concluding that
state laws are not a sufficient gap filler in the disability area); Ronald D. Rotunda,
The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV.
1183, 1189 (2002) (arguing that “Garrett is not a break with precedent but part of it,
and that Congress still has plenty of power” to protect the rights of persons with
disabilities); Michael L. Russell, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Eleventh Amendment: Do States Have a License to Discriminate?, 28 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 133, 146–47 (2001) (arguing that while the Garrett decision was disappointing
for employee rights advocates and others, there still exist several avenues by which
persons can enforce their rights under the ADA and similar antidiscrimination
statutes); Sienna DeAgostino, Note, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett: The Decision’s Impact on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 281 passim (2002) (exploring the effects of the Garrett decision on the
ADA); Kimberly E. Dean, Note, In the Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of
Prophylactic Anti-Discrimination Legislation Can Congress Enact After Garrett, 43
B.C. L. REV. 697, 725 (2002) (arguing “[t]he Boerne-Garrett line of cases represents
the Court’s clear attempt to diminish Congress’s power under Section 5 [of the
Fourteenth Amendment]”); Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights
Against Public Entities After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41 (2001) (arguing that the
outcome in Garrett was dictated neither by precedent nor by rational basis standard
of judicial review accorded disability based discrimination and evaluating the
possible effects of the Garrett decision); Mark A. Johnson, Note, Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett: A Flawed Standard Yields a Predictable
Result, 60 MD. L. REV. 393, 394 (2001) (arguing that Garrett was wrongly decided);
Geoffrey Landward, Comment, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett and the Equal Education Opportunity Act: Another Act Bites the Dust, 2002
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 313, 323–29 (2002) (applying the Garrett standard to the EEOA
and arguing that the standard will fail to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Jaclyn A. Okin, Comment, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: An
Analysis of University of Alabama v. Garrett and Its Impact on People with
Disabilities, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 663, 694 (2001) (arguing that “with
the ruling in Garrett, the Supreme Court is prohibiting further implementation of
the ADA, and it is unlikely that all individuals with disabilities will ever find
themselves fully integrated within society”); Nicole S. Richter, Note, The Americans
with Disabilities Act After University of Alabama v. Garrett: Should the States Be
Immune From Suit?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV 879, 892–98 (2002) (arguing that the ADA
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have rendered the federal courts a harsh environment for
workers with disabilities.119 Despite the clear links established
above, the cases do not reflect a Rawlsian interpretation of the
ADA.
A.

The Cases

1.

The Sutton Trilogy

In 1999, the Supreme Court decided the “Sutton trilogy” on
standing, comprised of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,120
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,121 and Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.122 In the leading case of the Sutton trilogy, two
applicants with severe but fully correctable nearsightedness
challenged United Air Lines’s requirement of uncorrected vision
of 20/100 or better for global pilots. Plaintiffs contended that
they had standing to assert an ADA claim because their visual
impairment was an actual disability, meaning a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities or, in the alternative, that they were “regarded as”
having such impairment by United.123 In diametric opposition to
the EEOC’s interpretation, the Court held that the ADA requires
an individualized consideration of the plaintiff’s undisputed
impairment, taking into account any medical treatment,

should apply to the states because it is a valid abrogation of the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Joan Shinavski, Note, The Eleventh Amendment Bars
Private Individuals from Suing State Employers for Money Damages Under Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 161 passim (2001) (discussing Eleventh Amendment
immunity in light of the Garrett decision).
119 Indeed, as Professor Ruth Colker has shown, ADA plaintiffs lose over 93% of
their cases, while employment discrimination plaintiffs in general lose only 22% of
their cases. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 99, 100, 100 n.10 (1999) (documenting
overwhelming pro-defendant outcome in appellate court decisions in ADA case
decisions since the ADA became effective). According to another recent study,
employers prevailed against workers and applicants in 95.7% of the Title I cases
decided on the merits in federal court. William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, ABA
JOURNAL, Aug. 2002, at 49, 50 (citing MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW
REPORTER). In addition, employers prevailed against workers and applicants in 73.3
percent of Title I cases resolved by EEOC administrative decision. Id.
120 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
121 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
122 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
123 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475–76.
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corrective devices and other mitigating measures.124 Because the
plaintiffs could fully correct their nearsightedness with contact
lenses, the Court found that, despite their impairments, the
plaintiffs were not actually disabled as defined by the first
prong. The Court then held that the plaintiffs were not
“regarded as” disabled because United did not regard them as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working but
only unable to perform the specific job of global pilot.
Similarly, in Albertson’s, the Court rejected the attempt by
an experienced driver with monocular but naturally
compensable vision to challenge Albertson’s failure to rehire him
on the basis of his uncorrected vision. The Court again found no
standing because, although monocular vision is a physical
impairment within the meaning of the ADA, the plaintiff’s
natural compensation mechanisms prevented the impairment
from substantially limiting his major life activities, specifically
the activity of seeing.125
In the third case, Murphy, the Court considered a mechanicdriver’s challenge to UPS’s failure to rehire him on the basis of
his failure to meet the blood pressure requirements for drivers of
commercial vehicles set by the Department of Transportation.
The Court found that he was not actually disabled within the
meaning of the ADA because his high blood pressure did not
substantially limit his major life activities when he was
medicated for his condition.126 Instead, his high blood pressure
simply rendered him unqualified for his specific job because he
was unable to obtain certification from the Department of
Transportation. The Court then held that the plaintiff was not
“regarded as” disabled because UPS did not regard him as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working but
only unable to perform the specific job of mechanic with driving

124 According to the Court, the EEOC’s “Interpretive Guidance” provides “[t]he
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assertive or prosthetic devices.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at
480 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998)). The Court determined that
no deference was due this regulation because “no agency has been delegated
authority to interpret the term ‘disability.’ ” Id. at 479.
125 Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 562–67.
126 Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
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duties due to failure to meet the applicable certification
standard.127
2.

Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams

Two years later, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v.
Williams,128 the Court narrowly construed the major life activity
of performing manual tasks.129 It found that an employee with
carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and other admitted
impairments was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because her impairments did not significantly affect her
activities of daily life but only the specific tasks of her actual
job.130 It was not disputed that the plaintiff’s impairment:
[P]revented her from doing the tasks associated with certain
types of manual assembly line jobs, manual product handling
jobs and manual building trade jobs (painting, plumbing,
roofing, etc.) that require the gripping of tools and repetitive
work with hands and arms extended at or above the shoulder
levels for extended periods of time.131

However, noting plaintiff’s ability to “brush her teeth, wash
her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do
laundry, and pick up around the house,” the Court stated that
“[w]hen addressing the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is
unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most people’s
daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform the
tasks associated with her specific job.”132

Id. at 521–25.
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
129 The Williams Court did not consider whether Williams was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. However, other courts have found that
to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the plaintiff must be
“ ‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities.’ ” Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819,
825 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)); see Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 492 (assuming that working is a major life activity, a claimant would be required
to show an inability to work in broad range of jobs, rather than a specific job).
130 Williams, 534 U.S. at 201–02.
131 Id. at 192 (quoting Williams v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 224 F.3d 840,
843 (6th Cir. 2000)).
132 Id. at 202, 200–01.
127
128
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Chevron v. Echazabal

As noted above, a worker with a disability can be barred
from the workplace under the ADA as not “otherwise qualified,”
which includes meeting legitimate qualifications that are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity, such as not
constituting a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace. In its 2002 decision Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,133 the Supreme Court interpreted the
ADA’s definition of the “direct threat” doctrine to include a
“threat-to-self” element and permitted an employer to reject an
applicant with a medical condition that it believes might be
exacerbated by workplace conditions. In that case Echazabal
sought employment at one of Chevron’s oil refineries, and was
refused employment on the basis of the opinion of Chevron’s
doctors that Echazabal’s liver condition would be exacerbated by
continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. Echazabal brought
suit, arguing that Chevron refused to hire him because of his
disability in violation of the ADA.134 Although the ADA provides
that an employer may require “that an individual shall not pose
a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace,”135 Chevron defended its refusal to hire in reliance on
a significantly broader EEOC regulation that provided that an
employer may reject a worker who poses “a direct threat to the
health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace.”136
In interesting contrast to its approach in the Sutton trilogy, the
Echazabal Court found that the EEOC’s extension of the
statutory language in Echazabal did not exceed the scope of
permissible rule making under the ADA.
4.

US Airways v. Barnett

The 2002 Court also created an additional bar to reasonable
accommodation—distinct from the undue burden analysis—in
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.137 In that case, the Court held that
in the absence of specific circumstances established by the
employee, an employer’s showing that the requested
133
134
135
136

added).
137

536 U.S. 73 (2002).
Id. at 76–77.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 77; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001) (emphasis
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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accommodation conflicts with an employer’s voluntary seniority
system is sufficient to show that the accommodation is not
reasonable.138 When Barnett injured his back as a cargo
handler, he was reassigned to the mailroom. Subsequently, his
mailroom position was opened to US Airways’s seniority
assignment system, and employees with more seniority
requested his assignment. US Airways refused his request to
keep his assignment as a reasonable accommodation of his
undisputed disability, and he filed an ADA suit. The District
Court and the Ninth Circuit both considered his request to keep
his assignment a reasonable accommodation to be granted
unless the employer can show that it represented an undue
burden in light of the seniority system. In contrast, the Supreme
Court held that the existence of a seniority system—whether
voluntary
or
collectively
bargained—impacted
the
reasonableness of the accommodation directly.139
B.

Excluding Workers with Mitigatable Impairments Does Not
Comport with the Principle of Fair Opportunity

In the Sutton trilogy, the Court espoused a narrow and
individualistic biomedical model as the primary understanding
of disability, resulting in a severe constriction of the protected
class. As Professor Paula Berg has noted:
Despite its centrality to antidiscrimination law, courts have
largely eschewed the socio-political perspective when
determining whether a plaintiff claiming discrimination is
disabled and therefore entitled to legal protection. Instead,
they have remained firmly entrenched in an essentialist
biomedical understanding of disability, which has resulted in
the fabrication of an extremely narrow category of disability. 140

The trilogy also creates a “Catch-22”—a worker with an
undisputed impairment who is rejected because of that
impairment has no standing to challenge the rejection if it so
happens that the impairment can be mitigated or corrected.
This is true even if the impairment does not affect the worker’s
Id. at 402–06.
Indeed, the seniority system at issue was voluntarily and unilaterally
imposed by US Airways, and was not the result of collective bargaining. Id. at 423–
24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140 Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the
Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 13
(1999).
138
139
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ability to do her job.141 Thus, employers are free to reject fully
capable workers with correctable impairments without fear of an
ADA claim because those workers are not “disabled” as defined
by the Court.
This interpretation of standing is not necessitated by the
language or structure of the ADA and fails to prevent the type of
irrational disability-based discrimination targeted by Rawls’s
principle of fair opportunity and the legislative history and
structure of the ADA. As a result of the Court’s decisions, many
workers who are able to do their jobs without any
accommodation and who experience real or perceived
impairments significant enough to form the basis of disabilitybased discrimination will be excluded from the workplace
without standing to seek relief. Reconsider the outcome of the
examples of irrational discrimination in Part II.B.2. The Court’s
decisions suggest that an employer who avoids rehiring workers
who have sustained injuries on the job because of a general fear
of re-injury may refuse to rehire that worker because of his
impairment even though he is able to safely perform the
essential functions of his job.142 They similarly suggest that an
employer for a parcel delivery service who falsely believes that
drivers with monocular vision are always unsafe may refuse to
hire a monocular driver based on that disability notwithstanding
his actual driving performance.143
This is not merely a
hypothetical possibility. One disability advocate has already
reported that one of her clients, an individual with a congenital
amputation, functioned so well with a prosthetic device that a
court found he was not disabled under the Sutton standard, yet
he was still rejected by the employer because of the prosthesis
even though it did not effect his ability to perform his job.144
141 The facts of cases such as Sutton can obscure this important point because
in such cases, even if the plaintiff had standing, relief would be denied for one of
several reasons: the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment renders her unable to
perform the essential functions of her job; reasonable accommodation is not possible
on the facts; or because such reasonable accommodation would be unduly
burdensome or pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. The Court, however,
never reaches any of these questions because it stops plaintiff short on the threshold
issue of standing.
142 See Munoz v. H & M Wholesale, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 596, 607–08 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
143 See EEOC v. UPS, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1168–69 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002).
144 Smith, supra note 191, at 51 (citing Arlene Mayerson of the Disability
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Excluding Workers with Mitigatable and/or Job-Specific
Impairments Does Not Comport with the Difference Principle

Pursuant to the Williams case, a worker with an
impairment that affects her ability to do her job, rather than to
perform daily activities unrelated to the job, can be rejected on
the basis of her impairment without recourse under the ADA.
This is true even if, as was the case in Williams, the impairment
could be, and had previously been, reasonably accommodated.
Taken together with the Sutton trilogy, these cases dramatically
constrict the protected class by excluding workers with
mitigatable impairments or job-specific limitations or both. In
effect, the Court has proceduralized the definition of disability
and severed it from the concepts of disability-based stigma and
prejudice as well as from the demands of the workplace.
This interpretation of standing is not necessitated by the
language or structure of the ADA and fails to prevent the type of
rational disability-based discrimination targeted by Rawls’s
difference principle and the legislative history and structure of
the ADA.
It is radically underinclusive if workers with
disabilities are defined with respect to the Rawlsian concept of
least advantaged. In addition, many workers who are able to do
their jobs with reasonable accommodation and also experience
real or perceived impairments significant enough to form the
basis of discrimination will be excluded from the workplace
without standing to seek relief. Reconsider the outcome of the
examples of rational discrimination in Part II.C.2. The Court’s
decisions suggest that the employer who does not want to spend
money on new ergonomically correct office equipment may refuse
to hire a specific worker with carpal tunnel syndrome who would
in fact require some specialized equipment. Consequently, the
ADA will fail to prohibit a great deal of irrational disabilitybased discrimination: “[L]ower courts following Toyota and the
Sutton trilogy may turn away precisely the workers the ADA
was designed to protect: people with disabilities who can do the
job with reasonable accommodations, but who don’t get hired
because of unfounded stereotypes.”145

Rights Education Fund).
145 Id. at 51 (citing Professor Scott C. Burris).
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D. Limiting the Employer’s Duty of Inclusion Does Not Comport
with the Difference Principle
The Echazabal and Barnett decisions indicate that even if a
worker manages to establish standing under the ADA, the
employer’s duty of inclusion is limited. The Court’s expansive
interpretation of the business necessity doctrine and narrow
interpretation of the reasonableness of accommodations
involving seniority systems is not necessitated by the language
or structure of the ADA. It also fails to prevent the type of
rational disability-based discrimination targeted by Rawls’s
difference principle and the legislative history and structure of
the ADA.
These cases continue to sanction the disabling of employees
who could perform the essential function of their jobs with
reasonable accommodation through employer rule making.
Indeed, the facts of the Williams case provide an illustration of
how workplace rule making can be disabling, as she was able to
perform her existing job duties until manual inspection tasks
were added to her job duties in 1996.146 As one author has
argued, the structure of the reasonable accommodation
requirement, particularly the strict application of the
requirement that a worker with a disability be able to perform
every essential function of the job as defined by the employer,
blocks the full inclusion of people with disabilities into economic
life as envisioned by the difference principle.147 Significantly, the
employer continues to hold the power to define work and normal
workplace standards.148 Prior to these cases, it was established
146 Plaintiff began working at an automobile manufacturing plant in 1990 on
the engine fabrication assembly line. When use of the pneumatic tools on the
assembly line caused pain in her hands, wrists, and arms, diagnosed as bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis, she was transferred to modified
duty jobs. In 1993, she was transferred to a paint and body inspection line which
required visual and manual inspection tasks. In light of her medical restrictions,
she performed only the visual inspection. However, in 1996, her employer
announced that all paint and body inspection line employees would be required to
perform both visual and manual inspection, the latter consisting of wiping down the
cars with a highlight oil. Soon after the manual inspection tasks were added to her
job duties, she began to experience debilitating pain in her neck and shoulders.
Thus, Ms. Williams was transformed from adequate worker to inadequate worker
by virtue of her employer’s policy change in 1996. And when she requested the
accommodation of returning to her original job of visual inspection, Toyota refused.
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187–90 (2002).
147 Gray, supra note 27, at 333.
148 Iris Marion Young, Disability and the Definition of Work, in AMERICANS
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that the employer may choose the type of accommodation with
no obligation to make the most efficacious or best
accommodation possible or every accommodation required, as
long as the accommodation made enables the individuals to
perform the essential job functions and provides the employee
with employment benefits equivalent to those of other
employees.149 However, these cases go much farther in limiting
the employer’s duty of inclusion, ironically in the language of
worker safety and labor or union rights. There is no recognition
of the disability category as a political and non-neutral
instrument of the employer to control the workforce.150
IV. SOME LIMITATIONS OF A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO THE ADA
Although the use of Rawlsian methodology as a foundation
for interpretation of the ADA in recent cases would lead to
results more in line with Rawlsian objectives as well as the
language and stated purposes of the ADA, it also reveals some
significant limitations of the Rawlsian approach.
A.

Can the Rawlsian Assumption of Rationality Overcome a
Failure of Identification?

Decision-makers in the original position are assumed to be
rational and able to identify with the experiences of others based
on the premise that they might be the “other” once the veil is
lifted. Does this kind of rationality assumption work for
disability in general or in the workplace in particular? Although
some have argued that disability fares well under a Rawlsian
analysis as outlined above, others have suggested that the
Rawlsian construct of decision making in the original position
will fail because people without disabilities will be unable to
identify with the experiences of people with disabilities.151
WITH DISABILITES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 71, at 169, 171.

LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND

See 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, App. § 1630.9 (1995).
Young, supra note 148, at 171.
151 This argument is related to but distinct from the general critique of
Rawlsian decisionmakers as isolated and atomistic. See Linda McClain, “Atomistic
Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1171, 1177 (1992) (contending that Rawls’s theory “views human beings as
essentially separate and disembodied from their social contexts” (citing MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982))); Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that Rawls’s
149
150
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Specifically, philosopher Anita Silvers argues that people
without disabilities lack “experiential accessibility” in such
situations:
What obstruct[s] ethical thinking here is that reasoning
responds to the common, not the deviant, case. In general, the
compulsion to dismiss the disabled as abnormal—that is, as
being in a state unthinkable for oneself—renders all appeals to
such criteria as what one would wish done were one in the
other person’s place ineffective where persons with disabilities
are concerned.152

There is, in fact, considerable evidence that suggests people
without disabilities are unable to identify with people with

theory describes persons as “distinct individuals first,” only forming “relationships
and engag[ing] in co-operative arrangements with others” thereafter); see also
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 149, 150 (1990) (stating that
Rawls’s theory claims to “be inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian,
yet . . . replicate[s] the process of exclusion and subordination that preserves the two
tracks of legal treatment,” and Rawls’s “heuristic device of the social contract
presumes to address only autonomous, independent individuals who can separate
themselves from others and enter freely, unencumbered, into an agreement about
how to conduct private and public affairs”). But see McClain, supra, at 1204 (noting
Rawls’s assertion that his theory is not atomistic because he argues that political
liberalism “rests upon shared public values that specify the fundamental terms of
political and social cooperation”). “Rawls also acknowledges that citizens could not,
in all likelihood, stand apart from their attachments and their views of the good,
which are so integral to their identity.” Id. “Rawls’s theory envisions not a
disembodied individual, but a society where recognition of interdependency leads to
mutual respect. . . .” Id. at 1209. In addition, Rawls advances the conception of
social union, a type of mutual cooperation necessary for self-completion. In short,
“Rawls’s justification pictures society not as atomistic or self-interested but as
interdependent and connected.” Id. at 1217.
152 Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for
People with Disabilities, in FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL POLICY 23, 29 (Patrice
DiQuinzio & Iris Marion Young eds., 1997). Although not specifically in the context
of disability, Martha Minow makes a similar point about Rawls’s requirement of
identification or consideration of others:
An especially telling remnant of particularity within Rawls’s failed
attempt to posit an individual removed from particular circumstances is
that the very form of his questions presumes that the person behind the
veil of ignorance is not the worst-off person. It assumes some essence of a
self preexisting one’s situation, and anyone would approach the possibility
of being worst off the same way. Like the assumption of an unsituated
perspective that contributes to the dilemma of difference, this approach
ignores contrary perspectives while denying that it is partial. Rawls’s
question is put only to the particular person who is not the worst off, a
particular person who is not likely to understand fully the situation of the
worst-off.
MINOW, supra note 151, at 154.
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disabilities, including empirical evidence indicating that people
without disabilities significantly and unreasonably devalue the
lives of people with disabilities. Indeed, the finding that people
with serious and persistent disabilities report a good or excellent
quality of life despite the negative judgment of external, nondisabled observers has been termed the “disability paradox.”153
For example, one study indicated that people with impairments
rated their lives as more difficult but not less happy or
satisfying. Moreover, only half, if given one wish, would use it to
remove their disability.154 Another found that:
[T]he disabled tend to think of themselves as less unfortunate,
less depressed, anxious and hostile than others judge them to
be. They give the same ratings as the non-disabled do on their
degree
of
satisfaction,
frustration
and
happiness.
Additionally . . . there is little association between good health
and happiness, except in the case of the fatally ill.155

Even people with serious disabilities have reported a quality
of life averaging only slightly lower than that reported by nondisabled people.156
The disparity between judgments of people with and people
without disabilities about the lives of people with disabilities
may be reflected and reinforced by a “spoiling process,” whereby
the physical impairment “ ‘obscure[s] all other characteristics
behind that one and swallow[s] up the social identity of the
individual within that restrictive category.’ ”157 In his influential
153 Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devlieger, The Disability Paradox: High
Quality of Life Against All Odds, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 977, 978–79 (1999).
154 Experiences of Deviance, Chronic Illness, and Disability, in THE SOCIAL
MEDICINE READER 75, 76 (Gail E. Henderson et al. eds., 1997).
[A]n investigation of 145 physically disabled individuals found that,
compared to nondisabled persons, those with impairments did not rate
their lives as less happy or satisfying. The people with disabilities did,
however, rate their lives as more difficult and likely to stay that way.
Another study of 88 seriously physically restricted persons posed the
question, “If you were given one wish, would you wish that you were no
longer disabled?” Only half said they would wish to remove their disability.
Id. (citation omitted).
155 Joan Susman, Disability, Stigma and Deviance, 38 SOC. SCI. & MED. 15, 17–
18 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
156 Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 71, at 102, 106.
157 Irving Kenneth Zola, Self, Identity, and the Naming Question: Reflections on
the Language of Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER, supra note 154, at 77,
80 (quoting Paul K. Longmore, A Note on Language and the Social Identity of
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work, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity,
sociologist Erving Goffman defines stigmatization as the process
by which a trait or difference, such as disability or perceived
disability, evokes a negative or punitive response.158 Goffman
asserts that a necessary but not sufficient basis of stigma is
deviance from accepted norms, as “a person is not a deviant until
his acts or attributes are perceived as negatively different.”159
Although disability is not necessarily stigmatizing, “research
reveals that it often undermines the taken-for-granted aspects of
ordinary encounters between disabled and non-disabled
people.”160 Similar concepts discussed in the social science
literature include disability as a “master status,” wherein “a
person who has an impairment somehow gets lost to awareness
and only the impairment itself remains seen”161 and “spread,”
defined as “the often unconscious assumption that a person,
disabled in one way, is therefore disabled in all other ways.”162
Disabled People, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 419 (1985)).
158 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).
159 Susman, supra note 155, at 16.
160 Id. at 17.
161 Id. at 19 (summarizing studies). Moreover, there is some evidence that the
labeling negatively impacts people with disability. See Bruce G. Link,
Understanding Labeling Effects in the Area of Mental Disorders: An Assessment of
the Effects of Expectations of Rejection, 52 AM. SOC. R. 96 (1987) (finding when
people enter psychiatric treatment and are labeled, beliefs that others devalue and
discriminate against mental patients become personally applicable and lead to selfdevaluation and/or the fear of rejection by others, which negatively impacts both
psychological and social functioning).
162 See Hugh Gregory Gallagher, “Slapping up Spastics”: The Persistence of
Social Attitudes Toward People with Disabilities, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 401, 411
(1995). There is some interesting work on why disability provokes such strong
emotional responses on the part of a person without a disability, responses which
may have little if anything to do with the disabled person’s reality. Professor Silvers
contends that “[a]dvantaged persons dread beholding damaged persons out of fear
that they in future might themselves become impaired.” Silvers, supra note 152, at
31 (citing Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity, 101 ETHICS 701, 718
(1991)). Another author’s review of the anthropological literature suggests that
disability’s “undue salience” is attributable to fear or dread of becoming disabled,
fear of dependence in light of our cultures excessive valuing of “independence, selfreliance, beauty, and health,” violation of “belief in a just world” and discomfort
with liminal categories such as disability. See Susman, supra note 155, at 19
(summarizing the work of Goffman, Mary Douglas and Claude Levi-Strauss, among
others) (citations omitted). Confronting disability may also reveal a clash of
different ways of perceiving disability—the ideology of normalization, overcoming
and sympathy versus the reality—”Occasions of social reality instead elicit feelings
of discomfort, confusion, even resentment toward the ‘defectiveness’ which is
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The disparity between judgments of people with and people
without disabilities about the lives of people with disabilities has
real and destructive potential. This was highlighted by the
debate surrounding the Oregon Health Care Plan (the “Oregon
Plan”), particularly its use of quality of life assessments to rank
treatments to be funded under Oregon’s Medicaid program.163 In
perceived to resist cure, to defy normalization, to cause societal problems.” Marilynn
J. Phillips, Damaged Goods: Oral Narratives of the Experience of Disability in
American Culture, 30 SOC. SCI. & MED. 849, 849 (1990). “Perhaps it is not
paradoxical that the American public are so generous at telethon–time, but reticent
to accommodate disabled persons in public settings. Might installing a wheelchair
ramp disaffirm the ideology of cure?” Id.
163 Oregon Basic Health Services Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.025–414.750
(1989) (enacting Senate Bill 27). The Oregon Plan raises a host of issues relating to
disability and the ADA which are beyond the scope of this Article. For more
discussion, see Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81
IOWA L. REV. 179, 181 (1995), on whether a cost-conscious futility policy violates the
ADA. See generally Timothy B. Flanagan, ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care
Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397 (1994) (concluding that publication of several
previously unpublished documents discussing whether the Oregon Plan’s reliance
on quality of life factors is permissible under the ADA); Kevin P. Quinn, Viewing
Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (2000) (discussing the limits of liberalism in the health care context and
arguing that the Oregon Plan is a good example of how we can view health care as a
political common good); Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against
Mental Health Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
315 (1996) (discussing whether the ADA can provide a basis for challenging
deliberate efforts by state and local entities to restrict coverage of mental health
services for people with psychiatric disabilities in Medicaid and other publiclyfinanced health care programs); James V. Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: What Protection Should the Disabled be
Afforded?, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581 (1993) (discussing whether the Oregon Plan
violates the ADA and what changes, if any, are necessary to bring the Oregon Plan
into compliance with the ADA); Robert J. Moosy Jr., Comment, Health Care
Prioritization and the ADA: The Oregon Plan 1991-1993, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 265
(1994) (analyzing and comparing the Oregon Plan’s 1991, 1992, 1993 amendments
prioritization methods and whether they violate the ADA); Note, The Oregon Health
Care Proposal and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1296
(1993) (discussing the ADA’s effects on the Oregon Plan and concluding that the
Oregon Plan probably withstands scrutiny under the ADA); Greg Phyllip Roggin,
Note, The “Oregon Plan” and the ADA: Toward Reconciliation, 45 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 219 (1994) (analyzing the Oregon Plan’s revised prioritization
process in light of the ADA and offering a balancing test for courts to use when
confronted with the Oregon Plan and ADA requirements); Nancy K. Stade, Note,
The Use of Quality-of-Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving a Rejected
Proposal, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1985 (1985) (discussing the Oregon Plan’s quality of life
measures in light of the ADA, and arguing that while state Medicaid agencies that
seek to ration on the basis of quality-of-life measures can avoid certain facial
conflicts with the ADA, the ADA must be modified by Congress to allow the use of
measures purporting to quantify the quality of life associated with particular

1/13/2004 7:53 AM

270

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:225

brief, in 1989 the Oregon legislature created a commission to
generate a prioritized list of individual health care services
based on importance, which, when adopted, would guide its
Medicaid financing decisions. Given available resources, the
legislature would include services in a fully-funded “standard
benefit package” in order of priority or rank, with services falling
below the selected rank excluded from coverage.164
As
documented by disability rights attorney Timothy Flanagan, the
commission’s process of prioritization started with drafting of a
list of conditions and paired treatments, which were then
prioritized on the basis of medical outcomes, as defined by
medical manuals and practicing medical professionals, and the
perceived quality of life related to each outcome.165 According to
one of the plan designers, “ ‘Estimates of how treatments affect
quality of life were by far the single most important factor in
determining priority order on that list.’ ”166 The commission also
polled one thousand Oregon residents by telephone, “asking
[them] to rank in order of undesirability and perceived quality of
life each of the impairments and symptoms” used to evaluate the
medical outcomes.167
Opponents of the Oregon Plan argued that the weight
accorded to subjective quality of life judgments in setting
priorities resulted in a devaluation of the lives of people with
disabilities relative to people without disabilities.168 In the
words of one author, “[w]hen quality of life is taken into account,
medical conditions in determining the allocation of Medicaid dollars); Catherine
Grace Vanchiere, Comment, Stalled on the Road to Health Care Reform: An
Analysis of the Initial Impediments to the Oregon Demonstration Project, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 405 (1993) (identifying underlying principles of the
Oregon plan).
164 Garvey, supra note 163, at 591.
165 For more detail on this process, see Flanagan, supra note 163, at 401–02.
166 Id. at 401 (quoting David C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise:
Quality of Life and Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (1991), Supp. at 11
(alteration in original).
167 Id. at 402.
168 Garvey, supra note 163, 583–84. “[T]he statistical data used to create the
plan’s quality of life quotients were nonobjective and arbitrary and were susceptible
to the societal prejudices and stereotypes that Congress sought to eradicate by
passing the ADA.” Flanagan, supra note 163, at 404. Further, rationing health care
based on quality of life assessments has been criticized as disadvantaging women
and children. See generally John La Puma, Quality-Adjusted Life-Years: Why
Physicians Should Reject Oregon’s Plan, in RATIONING AMERICA’S MEDICAL CARE:
THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 125, 125 (Martin A. Strostberg et al. eds., 1992).
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the very fact that a patient is disabled will automatically put
that person at a disadvantage.”169 Indeed, in some cases, the
availability of medically necessary treatment turned upon the
existence of disability.170 Because the surveys did not and
perhaps could not take into account the “disability paradox,”
people with disabilities were put at risk of disproportional denial
of health services based on prejudice, fear, and stereotypes.171
Thus, although ultimately defeated, the Oregon Plan experience
appears to support Silvers’s criticism of the original position:
“[V]eil of ignorance arguments substitute a kind of generalized
prudence for the motivating considerations which arise for each of us

169 Philip G. Peters Jr., Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 491, 536 (1995). Professor Peters argues that quality of life measurements such
as that used in the Oregon Plan may disadvantage people with disabilities in four
ways. First, “[w]hen outcomes are taken into account, patients with preexisting
disabilities, such as diabetes, cancer, or pulmonary disease, could be disfavored
because they often have more difficulty fighting unrelated illnesses (comorbidity)
than patients who are otherwise healthy.” Id. at 500. Second, the valuation of
outcomes may disfavor seriously disabled patients if saving the life of a disabled
person with an impaired quality of life generate fewer quality–adjusted life years
than saving the life of a person whose quality of life after treatment would be
higher. Third, permanently disabled patients in need of noncritical care could be
disfavored if their disabilities limit the extent of improvement from treatment.
Fourth, the scales used to measure quality of life underestimate the quality of life
enjoyed by people with disabilities. See id. at 533–37.
At least four arguments in support of quality of life considerations are
possible. One, suggested by David Hardon, is that quality of life measurements are
appropriate because they measure the expected change in quality of life rather than
the point-in-time quality of life of the patient. See id. at 536. A second potential
justification is that quality of life is measured from the patient’s perspective, not
society’s. QALY’s typically do not attempt to establish the social worth of an
individual by measuring factors like future employment prospects or moral
character. See id. at 537. Paul Menzel suggests that reasonable persons would
consent to the use of quality of life considerations because the harm to those most in
need of care which results from their use in some contexts is offset by the advantage
that they will confer on those individuals in other circumstances. See id. at 538. The
fourth and strongest reason for taking quality of life into account is that quality of
life really does not influence the value of life. See id. at 539.
170 For example:
[L]iver transplants for alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver is at number 690, and
therefore outside the coverage of the “standard benefit package.” However,
liver transplants for non-alcoholic cirrhosis is at number 366, and thus
part of the package. Because the ADA considers an alcoholic “disabled,” the
Oregon Plan would deny the “disabled” individual medically necessary
treatment, while an “abled” individual with the same malady would be
treated.
Garvey, supra note 163, at 591–92 (citations omitted).
171 See Flanagan, supra note 163, at 404; Rubenstein, supra note 163, at 346.
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out of our personalized experiences of what we are and how we need to
live. But, in abstraction, prudence rarely moves us to precautions
against eventualities we find unthinkable.”172

How can the Rawlsian assumption of rationality overcome
the “disability paradox?”173 One solution is to promote greater
integration of people with disabilities into every avenue of
American life, including the workplace. This would provide an
opportunity for the currently non-disabled majority to become
educated about the reality of life with a disability and to dispel
certain stereotypes based on fear and ignorance.174

Silvers, supra note 82, at 170.
This leaves aside the possible argument that a failure of identification is a
failure of Rawlsian rationality because disability arouses a deep and intractable
prejudice. If disability is not attributable to culture and is instead innate, then the
thought experiment of the original position and its veil of ignorance fails because it
has no connection to any decisionmaking reality. This may be relevant to the
consideration of disability and disability-based discrimination if the fear of
dismemberment or disfigurement (which may relate to some but certainly not all
forms of disability) can be considered innate and not culturally constructed, but this
is a question for cultural anthropologists and beyond the scope of this analysis. I
would like to thank my colleague, Andrew J. Cappel, for this point.
174 There is evidence that people with previous interactions with people with
disabilities report more positive perceptions about people with disabilities than
those without similar previous experiences. See Mike Lyons, Enabling or Disabling?
Students’ Attitudes Toward Persons with Disabilities, 45 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL
THERAPY 311 (1993) (noting Australian college students who had experienced
contact with people with persons with disabilities outside the caregiving context had
significantly more positive attitudes than students without such contact); Amy K.
Wagner & Paula J. B. Stewart, Education and Administration: An Internship for
College Students in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 80 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED.
& REHABILITATION 459, 461–62 (2001) (summarizing research). More specifically,
studies show that positive, direct, and structured contact between people with and
people without disabilities decreases disability-based bias among the people without
the disability in educational and pre-professional contexts. See generally Lyons,
supra; Michael Shevlin & Astrid Mona O’Moore, Fostering Positive Attitudes:
Reactions of Mainstream Pupils to Contact with Their Counterparts Who Have
Severe/Profound Intellectual Disabilities, 15 EUR. J. SPECIAL NEEDS EDUC. 206
(2000) (determining structured contact between non-disabled Irish school children
and their profoundly intellectually disabled peers resulted in development and
maintenance of significantly more positive attitudes of the former toward the
latter); April Tripp et al., Contact Theory and Attitudes of Children in Physical
Education Programs Toward Peers with Disabilities, 12 ADAPTED PHYSICAL
ACTIVITY Q. 323 (1995) (finding children in an integrated setting had significantly
more positive attitudes toward peers with behavioral disabilities, but not physical
disabilities, than those in segregated settings); Wagner & Stewart, supra
(concluding college student participation in a Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
internship positively impacted participants’ perceptions of people with disabilities).
But see David Slininger et al., Children’s Attitudes Toward Peers with Severe
Disabilities: Revisiting Contact Theory, 17 ADAPTED PHYSICAL ACTIVITY Q. 176,
172
173
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Does a Political ADA Go Far Enough?

Rawls’s conception of the overlapping consensus upon which
the right kind of political stability depends requires the
exclusion of unreasonable doctrines:175
[A] society is well ordered by justice as fairness so long as, first,
citizens who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines
generally endorse justice as fairness as giving the content of
their political judgments; and second, unreasonable
comprehensive doctrines do not gain enough currency to
compromise the essential justice of basic institutions.176

Rawls suggests that a comprehensive doctrine that proposes
that basic rights and political power be distributed according to
characteristics such as race, sex, or ethnicity should be excluded
as unreasonable.177 Thus, it appears that a doctrine that
proposes the distribution of work according to a characteristic
such as the absence of any impairment—without regard to
whether the impairment was relevant to job performance—
should also be excluded as unreasonable.
Beyond the rejection of a blatantly ableist viewpoint, does
the concept of reasonable pluralism still exclude too much to
achieve meaningful inclusion for workers with disabilities?
Consider that we could have a purely pluralist, rather than
reasonably pluralist, version of the ADA that requires
accommodation of all impairments regardless of whether they
rise to the legal definition of “disability” and full and appropriate
accommodation of impairments in the workplace, rather than
176–79 (2000) (summarizing research and noting that the literature does not
uniformly support contact theory as a guide to changing children’s behavior toward
peers with disabilities).
175 Rawls contrasts the stability produced by the overlapping consensus with
another, less preferable type of stability—the modus vivendi agreement,
characterized by a practical compromise between existing comprehensive doctrines.
Rawls argues that the modus vivendi agreement is less preferable because an
individual does not reach the compromise consensus as a result of the principles of
his or her own comprehensive doctrine, and in fact may reach such compromise for
practical reasons despite those principles. See generally RAWLS, RESTATEMENT,
supra note 28, at 192–98.
176 Id. at 187; see also Friedman, supra note 59, at 27 (exploring the rationale
and consequences of Rawls’s exclusion of the unreasonable from the “legitimization
pool”).
177 See supra note 59.
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simply reasonable accommodation. Of course, the language of
the ADA itself does some of the excluding, as it provides that
workers who are not “disabled” do not have standing and that
disabilities need only be reasonably accommodated. But by
going far beyond the language of the ADA, the Court’s decisions
suggest its commitment to excluding what it defines as
unreasonable definitions of disability, unreasonable definitions
of work, or unreasonable accommodations. As a result, very few
workers with disabilities are able to demonstrate that they meet
the legal definition of disability, that they are qualified to do the
job as defined by the employer, or that the requested
accommodation is reasonable.
Under one reading of the Court’s recent cases, it does not
make these exclusions on the basis of a comprehensive moral
doctrine: it does not argue that its approach to disability-based
discrimination is “right” in some moral sense.178 Indeed, the
language of the decisions suggests a prudentialist argument: the
Court’s decision is reasonable because of its sense—correct or
not—that such exclusion is what has always been done or
because it would be too expensive and disruptive to do it
otherwise.179 Such an interpretation resonates with Rawls’s
concern with exclusion of unreasonable doctrines for purposes of
stability as well as with critiques of Rawlsian theory as
essentially conservative and legitimating of the status quo.180
Much of the ADA’s legislative history suggests a
fundamental and deeply comprehensive argument that people
178 Of course, an alternative reading would be that the Court is analyzing the
cases on the basis of a comprehensive moral doctrine such a utilitarian economic
analysis. See generally Pendo, supra note 11 (discussing the encroachment of an
economic-based efficiency analysis within the reasonable accommodation and the
undue burden analysis).
179 For example, the Barnett Court explained that the employer’s voluntary
seniority system should not be undermined by a request for reasonable
accommodation absent special circumstances because it would “undermine the
employees’ expectation of consistent, uniform treatment—expectations upon which
the seniority system’s benefits depend.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
404 (2002). As Justices Souter and Ginsburg note in their dissenting opinion, the
workers reasonable expectations in this regard are significantly weaker than that
suggested by the majority, as US Airways explicitly reserved the right to change the
system at any time. Id. at 423–24 (Souter, J., dissenting). Even if we accept that the
expectations are reasonable, the majority does not explain why such expectations
should continue to be protected in light of the competing requirements and
underlying purpose(s) of the ADA.
180 See NEAL, supra note 56, at 185–205.
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with disabilities have a right to be included in all aspects of
modern life and to be free of discrimination on the basis of
stereotype, stigma, and myth. As Rawls explains, however, a
liberal theory that is political as opposed to comprehensive
attempts to avoid thorny philosophical questions by “deliberately
stay[ing] on the surface, philosophically speaking” and “leav[ing]
aside philosophical controversies.”181 This unwillingness to
engage in a philosophical defense of disability rights limits a
Rawlsian interpretation of the ADA. Indeed, it appears that
other comprehensive doctrines, particularly the utilitarian costbenefit approach, take over when Rawls’s justice as fairness runs
out, largely to the detriment of the rights of workers with
disabilities. 182
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent ADA decisions have spurred
rather than settled debate on fundamental questions about the
scope and purpose of the ADA. Who should the ADA be
protecting? People unable to perform their specific job? Any job?
Or only those that cannot perform basic and typical daily
functions? People whose workplaces are disabling? Who should
be reasonably accommodated in the workplace? The continuing
debate surrounding these questions reveal a deep conflict in our
understanding of disability and the justness of its social,
political, and economic consequences.
The cases also signal a significant, continued limitation of
access to the ADA’s protection through procedural devices such
as standing. As this Article shows, whatever the Supreme Court
is doing in these cases is not linked to any broader concept of
distributive justice, such as that developed by Rawls. Indeed,
this analysis suggests that the process of contraction of rights in
the context of the ADA has links to a broader attempt by the
judiciary to constrain the reach of empowering democratic
experiments through the application of seemingly neutral rules
and requirements in multiple contexts.
Using Rawlsian
methodology as a foundation for interpretation of the ADA in
recent cases would lead to results more in line with Rawlsian
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 28, at 230.
See Pendo, supra note 11, at 1204–08 (discussing the encroachment of an
economic-based efficiency analysis within the reasonable accommodation and the
undue burden analysis).
181
182
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objectives as well as the language and stated purposes of the
ADA. Although Rawls does not take us as far as we want to go,
his theory has significant value for understanding and
advancing the interests of workers with disabilities and perhaps
those without disabilities as well.

